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Much has changed in international finance in the twenty years since UNU-WIDER was 
founded. This paper identifies five broad contours of what we might expect in the next 
twenty years: the flow of capital from ageing societies to the more youthful economies of 
the South; the growth in the financial services industry in emerging economies and the 
consequences for their capital flows; the current strength in emerging market debt, and 
whether this represents a change in fundamentals or merely the effect of low global 
interest rates; the impact of globalization in goods markets in lowering inflation 
expectations, and therefore global bond yields; and the implications of the adjustment in 
global imbalances between Asia (in particular China) and the United States for emerging 
bond markets as a whole. The paper ends by noting the paradox that today we see ever 
larger amounts of capital flowing across the globe in search of superior investment 
returns, and yet the financing needs of the poorer countries are still largely unmet. 
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1 Introduction 
In August 1986, the year after UNU-WIDER began its work, the Institute hosted a 
conference to honour the memory of Carlos Díaz-Alejandro. Nearly twenty years on it 
is instructive to look over the resulting conference volume, Debt, Stabilization and 
Development (Calvo et al. 1989) to see how the world has, and has not, moved on. The 
book contains much discussion of whether a truly global market in capital has emerged, 
as well as the real effects of capital flows on developing countries—both areas of major 
debate today. Latin America’s deepening debt crisis and the effects of the ‘first 
generation’ of reform programmes then underway across the developing world also 
featured. The terminology of ‘emerging economies’ was not yet common coin (the first 
retail fund for emerging markets did not list on the New York Stock Exchange until 
1987), and the major global macroeconomic imbalance was between the USA and Japan 
(not China). Moreover, the acceleration in financial globalization via the new 
information technologies was only just beginning; Raj Kumar and Joseph Stiglitz (1989: 
442) in their paper on sources of technological divergence between developed and 
developing economies write of ‘… greater talk about computers in Silicon Valley’. 
 
Much has changed over twenty years. Funds investing in emerging market bonds and 
equities are taking in record amounts, and the pensions of Mr and Mrs Virtanen 
(Finland’s Mr and Mrs Smith) now in part depend on the prospects for Chinese 
sovereign debt.1 But much also remains the same, in particular Africa’s plight. In the 
mid 1980s Africa was undergoing the first of many structural adjustment programmes, 
some of which worked and many of which failed dismally—resulting in the debt 
accumulation that has been one of the big concerns of recent years. UK finance 
minister, Gordon Brown proclaims the need for a new ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’ but 
this call first went out in the 1980s.  
 
In 1985 new events and crises were just around the corner: notably the Japanese 
financial bubble and subsequent collapse; economic transition and meltdown in the 
communist world; the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the rapid integration of 
China into the global economy (resulting in trade tensions that have now come to the 
fore). These outcomes were largely unforeseen twenty years ago. So it may seem 
reckless to try and make predictions about the next twenty years. Nevertheless, 
speculation about the future is irresistible, not least to see how far one gets it wrong 
when we look back from the vantage point of 2025—the year in which UNU-WIDER 
will celebrate its fortieth anniversary. 
 
                                                 
1 In 2004, Finnish pension funds accounted for 7 per cent of the €4 billion of orders for a €1 billion 
Chinese government bond—their first significant purchase (Guerrera 2004).   2
International finance and the developing world is necessarily a very large subject, and 
therefore I confine myself to only some important aspects, leaving many others for 
discussion elsewhere—thus, on official aid flows see Addison et al. (2005); on new and 
innovative sources of development finance see Atkinson (2004); and on foreign direct 
investment see Asiedu (2006). The aspects that I do cover are as follows: the 
implications of ageing in the ‘North’ for investment in the ‘South’; the expected growth 
in the financial services industry in emerging economies and the consequences for their 
capital flows; the impact of the present low levels of global interest rates on emerging 
market debt; and the impact of globalization in goods markets in lowering inflation 
expectations, and therefore global bond yields, and the implications of China’s rise for 
this story. I close the paper by noting the paradox that today we see ever larger amounts 
of capital flowing across the globe in search of superior investment returns, and yet the 
financing needs of the poorest countries (and the world’s poorest people) remain largely 
unmet.  
2  Ageing and global capital flows  
An ageing world population is a certainty, barring some catastrophic health shock such 
as a global influenza pandemic which would disproportionately affect the elderly. 
Fertility rates are falling almost everywhere and life expectancy is rising, with the 
exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries with HIV/AIDS rates; people over the 
age of 65 will account for 16 per cent of the world’s population by 2050, up from 7 per 
cent in 2000. These powerful demographic forces are now reshaping the global 
economy, not least in the area of finance where ageing influences cross-country savings 
rates (and therefore international flows of capital) as well as the rates of return that 
pension funds can expect (through the impact of ageing on economic growth). 
 
Economic growth in the ageing societies of Europe and Japan will slow as workforces 
decline, unless labour productivity rises to compensate. Increased immigration (by no 
means certain) will be insufficient since an inconceivably large number of young 
immigrants are required to maintain the present ratio of workers to pensioners. The 
economies of Europe and Japan will therefore shrink relative to countries with younger 
populations, notably Brazil, India and the USA. Countries with young populations have 
a ‘demographic window of opportunity’ that gives them a potential advantage in the 
global economy, lasting until their present cohort of young workers retires. Investing 
retirement savings in these economies may therefore generate superior returns to those 
from investing at home, thereby pushing capital towards the former.  
 
This is a seductive story and a popular one in the financial investment industry (not least 
in their sales pitch to investors) and for the North’s retirees it is increasingly compelling 
since returns on annuities have fallen sharply (in the UK by almost two-thirds since 
1990). This reflects rising life expectancy and a fall in yields, especially on government 
bonds which make up a large amount of pension fund assets (increasingly so after the   3
equity market correction of 2000-03 which raised the deficits of company pension 
funds, leading them to reallocate from equities to bonds). In the UK case, the fall in 
yields on long-term gilts has been spectacular and real long-term interest rates are now 
around 1 per cent (their lowest level in 50 years). The fall in yields is self-reinforcing as 
pension funds are forced to bid up gilt prices (thereby reducing their yield) since their 
liabilities are calculated using a discount rate based on the long-gilt yield (and the 
present value of future liabilities rises as yields fall). The yield on US 30-year inflation-
protected bonds, a key investment for US pension funding, is now below 2 per cent, and 
10-year US treasury yields hover around 4 per cent. This makes the 8 per cent yield on a 
Brazilian 2040 note very attractive, to take just one example.  
 
However, resolving the North’s pension problem by investing in the youthful South is 
not without problems. Perhaps the most fundamental is that regions with the youngest 
populations face the greatest difficulties in accelerating growth, notably SSA and North 
Africa. This might provide an incentive for Northern countries to increase official aid if 
aid raises growth (by financing infrastructure to stimulate higher rates of private 
investment in sectors employing young workers, for example). Investors then benefit 
from higher returns in equity markets, and find corporate debt more attractive. If aid 
helps to improve fiscal institutions and thereby raises the ability of poorer countries to 
manage their public finances, then their sovereign debt is more attractive to 
international investors. The associated improvement in macroeconomic stability would 
also reduce the exchange rate risk that foreign investors face in purchasing financial 
instruments, both private and public, denominated in local currencies. But nobody is yet 
making these arguments for aid in policy circles, and while there appears to be a 
positive relationship between aid and growth, there remains a very active debate about 
exactly how much more aid countries can absorb and effectively use (Killick 2005; 
Sachs 2005). Therefore, while we can expect to see more Northern investor interest in 
the ‘exotic’ financial markets of the poorer South, this is likely to be a slow and 
somewhat tentative process, notwithstanding the benefits of diversification that these 
markets offer, an issue that I discuss shortly.  
 
The countries that are most attractive to Northern investors are those enjoying high 
growth, but many of these also have ageing populations, notably China, where retirees 
now outnumber new workers and there will be four retirees for every ten Chinese 
workers by 2030 (the ratio is presently one-to-three). This implies a growing pool of 
domestic savings chasing the returns in domestic financial markets, and China’s state 
pension fund is itself increasingly investing overseas. 
 
Equally important, high growth does not convert automatically into higher returns for 
portfolio investors. China’s stock market has fallen to its lowest point since 2000 
despite annual GDP growth of close to 10 per cent. Natural-resource rents that flow 
overwhelmingly to state-owned oil companies account for much of the Middle East’s 
present growth, not the private sector raising capital for investment via equity and debt   4
markets (which would employ the region’s very young population). And more 
generally, the returns to foreign investors depend upon foreign exchange risk (itself 
partly a function of a country’s macroeconomic policy) as well as the quality of 
corporate governance, especially the protection of minority shareholder rights. 
 
Investors must also put a sufficiently high proportion of their portfolio into the 
emerging market asset classes to benefit significantly (making allowance also for 
investment fees which are typically high). But investors hold more of their wealth in 
domestic assets than standard portfolio theory would predict (Lewis 1999), a ‘home 
bias’ that may now be starting to decline (see the next section) but one which remains 
strong nevertheless. Pension funds are also limited by law in the amount that they can 
invest in financial assets that are less than AAA investment-grade. Diversification 
towards emerging markets is traditionally thought to reduce the overall variance of a 
portfolio otherwise consisting of developed-country bonds and equities, but this may be 
less true in today’s world of increasingly integrated capital markets, in which 
correlations between markets are declining. Nevertheless, diversification towards 
smaller stock markets in low-income countries may still reduce the overall standard 
deviation of a portfolio consisting of bonds, developed country equities, and the larger 
emerging markets. Collins and Biekpe (2002) find that most African stock markets, with 
the exemption of the larger markets of Egypt and South Africa, did not experience 
contagion during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, for example. 
 
Finally, in the North it is the wealthy that have the greatest interest in emerging markets 
and obviously the greatest ability to invest and to take the risks implicit in the 
potentially high returns, not the poor who have the fewest pension assets, and generally 
the least investment knowledge. North-South capital flows are therefore unlikely to 
constitute any part of the solution to poverty among the elderly in the North, who will 
almost certainly continue to rely on their often meagre state pensions.  
 
In summary, the story is more complex than that put out by the investment industry 
which has its own (highly profitable) reasons for encouraging flows into its emerging 
market funds. With these caveats in mind, and for investors willing to take the plunge, 
the range of emerging market assets is widening, and this trend seems set to continue, 
with the following categories of particular interest:   
 
•  Municipal bonds. The need for infrastructure investment—in telecommunications, 
power, and roads—in the developing world is considerable, amounting to US$465 
billion annually, or 5.5 per cent of their GDP, from 2005-10 (Fay and Yepes 2003: 
17). International emerging market bond funds now include municipal bonds, 
mainly from Latin America, and there must be scope for raising capital in this way 
for SSA’s infrastructure, thereby reducing dependence on official aid (Leigland 
1997).   5
•  Corporate bonds. Firms in emerging economies have traditionally relied on 
retained profits and bank loans for investment finance, but issuing corporate debt 
could be attractive to international investors searching for yield. However, 
international investors find the smallness and illiquidity of these markets 
unattractive. India’s market is growing but remains small and fragmentary and 
afflicted by regulatory weakness, for example (Guha-Khasnobis and Kar 2005). 
Nevertheless, some middle-income countries have been able to interest global 
investors in their corporate debt markets. 
•  Property. Emerging market property is a potential asset class for the future, 
although international investor interest is confined to a small number of (mainly 
Asian) countries at present. There is a chance that mortgage loans from 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) could be bundled into securitized assets and sold 
internationally, since the connection between MFIs and formal financial 
institutions is at last increasing, at least in some countries (see the next section).  
 
3  Southern financial services and capital flows 
Financial services are growing rapidly in Brazil China, India, and Russia; by 2010 
China’s financial services sector will be as large as Italy’s and will exceed Germany’s 
by 2020 (Goldman Sachs 2003). Restructuring of domestic financial services featured in 
‘second generation’ reform programmes, with the privatization (either in whole or part) 
of state-owned banks including recapitalization by foreign banks in some cases 
(although a number of countries still limit foreign investment). This process has not 
been straightforward, banking crises have been unexpectedly frequent, and the impact 
on domestic investment and growth receives mixed reviews.2 Nevertheless, foreign 
investment in this sector looks set to accelerate especially in Latin America3 and in 
China which the big global banks see as a very attractive market. 
 
Intense competition in mature financial markets and the fall in global interest rates have 
cut bank profit margins. Their profitability rests on borrowing short and lending long, 
but the compression of the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates (the 
flattening of the yield curve which we discuss further below) is forcing international 
banks to accelerate their search for new and growing markets. The interest rate spread 
between savings and lending rates is now less than 1 per cent in developed economies 
but remains up to 4-10 per cent in emerging economies. The latter is also falling as 
international banks enter the market, thereby deepening domestic financial systems, but 
banks then expect to profit from providing mortgages, mutual funds, insurance and 
credit cards, the demand for which is expected to rise with the growing middle class in 
                                                 
2 For scepticism see Stiglitz (2002: 69). 
3  See Guillén (2000).   6
emerging economies. Locally-owned banks that succeed in becoming international 
players will also drive down transactions costs and expand the range of services. This 
growth will have some major consequences for capital flows, including:  
 
•  More finance for mergers and acquisitions at home and abroad by the most 
successful emerging market companies which are turning themselves into 
international companies. The rapid expansion of India’s Mittal Steel, now the 
world’s largest steel company (and based in London and Rotterdam), is a foretaste 
of what will happen. 
 
•  Mutual funds and pension products, and their growth through increased 
investment abroad, a trend encouraged by a loosening of limits on their allocations  
to foreign assets (the Chilean case, for example).  
 
•  Growth in Islamic financial products, a US$200 billion market (these instruments 
do not pay interest, but are structured in such a way that the holder receives a 
rental income on the underlying assets). Bahrain, the Gulf States, and Malaysia 
are selling Islamic financial services globally, and the middle-class in Africa (a 
region with more Muslims than Christians) is a small but expanding market. 
 
•  Increased competition is reducing the high transactions costs of making 
remittances; Western Union has cut its fee to US$10 on a US$200 transfer from 
the USA to Mexico. Remittances are growing rapidly as ‘talent’ becomes more 
mobile internationally (Solimano 2005). The World Bank estimates the annual 
value of remittances at US$95 billion but the true figure could be two or three 
times greater—it is difficult to guess how much flows through the hawala and 
other informal transfer mechanisms (Solimano 2004: 177-99). 
 
•  Greater connections from international capital markets to microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) eventually turning microfinance into a viable asset class for 
international investors. The first step is connecting MFIs to the domestic (formal) 
capital market. In 2004 Citigroup/Banamex helped Mexico’s Compartamos (Latin 
America’s biggest provided of microfinance) to raise the first slice of a US$45 
billion (peso denominated) bond from Mexican institutional investors. An IFC 34 
per cent guarantee on the bonds helped them achieve an AA investment grade 
rating by Standard & Poor’s. Tapping into global private equity also offers a 
direct route to international capital; Prisma Microfinance Inc of Boston funds 
MFIs in Central America this way. Leveraging remittance flows by using them to 
back bonds to finance mortgages for house purchases by recipient families is 
another innovation which may become more important.  
 
•  Reduced transactions costs, and increased speed, in making cross-border 
philanthropic transfers to NGOs, humanitarian agencies and (increasingly) direct   7
to individuals and communities. We can expect growth in flows of charitable 
donations from emerging economies with a rising middle class. Chinese 
individuals and companies donated some US$15 million for Asian countries hit by 
the 2004 tsunami disaster, for example.4 
 
In summary, these are trends to watch for the future. Yet they are not without problems. 
Much depends on whether fast growth is sustained in the emerging economies, with 
China being critical to what happens next (see later discussion). Moreover, the increase 
in portfolio flows through increasingly sophisticated financial sectors will make it 
trickier for policymakers to manage the macroeconomic effects of capital flows.5 And a 
fundamental challenge is to encourage inflows to poorer countries (in part by deepening 
their domestic financial markets), and reducing the exclusion of the poor from formal 
financial markets (and therefore indirectly from access to international capital).  
4  Global interest rates and capital flows 
One big difference with the world of twenty years ago is the cost of money; in 1985 the 
US was just coming out of its adjustment to the round of sharp rate rises begun by 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker in October 1979.6 Fast forward to the present 
and the yield on the 10-year US Treasury note is around 4 per cent compared with 15 
per cent back in the early 1980s. The real (inflation-adjusted) cost of money has fallen 
substantially. In the UK the long-term real rate is around 1 per cent, having varied 
between 2 and 4 per cent for much of the last 25 years.  
 
From 2000 to 2004 the US Federal Reserve (Fed) loosened monetary policy in response 
to the bursting of the tech-stock bubble (1996-2000) and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 
Federal funds rate, charged on overnight loans between banks, eventually reached 1 per 
cent in 2004, its lowest rate since the 1950s. The Fed went into reverse in June 2004 
with the first increase in the Fed funds rate in four years, marking the start of 14 
successive quarter-percentage point increases to 4.25 per cent as of January 2006. The 
Fed has signalled further increases, although the market consensus at the start of 2006 
was for a pause after one more quarter-percentage point increase. However, while the 
Fed has raised short rates, the long end of the yield curve has actually fallen—thereby 
flattening the overall yield curve—and the yield on the 10-year US Treasury note is now 
below its level at the start of the Fed credit-tightening cycle. This is a ‘puzzle’ that is 
now exercising the market’s best minds (see further discussion below). Bond yields are 
also at all-time lows in the six-year-old euro zone—the yield on 10-year German bunds 
                                                 
4 Source: ‘Japan, China Enter New Era of Giving’, Wall Street Journal, 11 January 2005. 
5 Which can sometimes be destabilizing; see Griffith-Jones et al. (2001). 
6 Cooper and Little (2000: 77-121).   8
is around 3.2 per cent—and long yields are close to 1 per cent in Japan, reflecting price 
deflation over the last decade. 
 
With global monetary easing, the prices of all major assets—equities, bonds, and 
property—are now substantially higher than two years ago, and emerging market 
equities and bonds are amongst the strongest performing asset classes. The JP Morgan 
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+), which is the industry benchmark for US 
funds investing in emerging market debt, returned 8.01 per cent in the 6 month period 
up to 28 February 2005, easily beating the paltry interest on any money market account. 
Large inflows from institutional and retail investors have occurred over the last five 
years, particularly pension funds as noted earlier and this provides a level of market 
support which was largely absent in the past.  
 
The risk premium on emerging market debt has also fallen with improvements in the 
public finances of emerging economies; this is partly a consequence of the commodity-
market boom itself resulting from strong growth in China and India. In mid 2005, 
EMBI+ spreads over US treasuries were at their lowest level (338 basis points) since 
1997 (just before Russia’s sovereign default). Half of the countries in EMBI+ now have 
an investment grade credit rating, which is unprecedented in the history of emerging 
market debt. 
 
What does the future hold? A rising Fed Funds rate is typically adverse for high-yield 
debt markets, emerging bond markets included. If you believe that ‘push factors’ (global 
capital supply) are more important than ‘pull’ factors (emerging market characteristics) 
in determining the flows into and out of emerging market debt—and there is increasing 
evidence that the former are more important than the latter7—then a rising Fed Funds 
rate does not bode well for the future. Moreover, the recent reversal in the dollar’s 
fortunes (at least against the euro) reduces the relative attractiveness of non-dollar 
investments for both long-term US investors (to whom emerging markets have been 
sold as a way of playing the dollar’s decline) and short-term investors engaged in the 
‘carry trade’ (borrowing in US dollars to invest in non-dollar assets). Some market 
participants believe that the carry trade has created a major over-pricing of risky assets, 
emerging market debt included, as investors ‘reach for yield’. This is consistent with a 
view that ‘fair value’ is only rarely seen in a market whose swings depend upon herd 
behaviour and momentum trading. The carry trade started to unwind in 2004 as the Fed 
raised rates although it has recently resumed along with the fall in US long yields. 
 
The hedge-fund industry will play a central role in what happens next since it is often 
the market’s marginal buyer (or seller); hedge funds now manage about US$1 trillion 
globally (double their 2000 level). Hedge funds as a whole were short on emerging 
                                                 
7 See Fitzgerald (2005); Mody and Taylor (2002).   9
market debt in the first half of 2005, betting against high-yield debt in general on the 
expectation of weakness as the Fed Fund rate increases. Spreads over US treasuries 
rose, although not by as much as the spreads on US high-yield corporate debt. However, 
short positions are now being closed as the decline in long yields resumes making the 
carry trade profitable again. The risks are, however, rising all the time since with the 
compression in spreads between high-yield debt and treasuries, hedge funds must 
increase their leverage to achieve superior returns, increasing their chances of a blow up 
if spreads reverse their decline. One hedge-fund manager recently compared this to 
pushing down a spring ‘you keep having to press it harder when it is already 
compressed and that is dangerous’.8 
 
Long yields may rise independently of any action by the Federal Reserve if Asian 
central banks diversify significantly away from US treasuries, as many observers 
predict. However, for the moment the long-end is falling. For bears this is a temporary 
aberration indicating that the market has a misplaced belief that US growth will soften, 
thereby implying that the Federal Reserve will cease tightening after one or two more 
quarter-point rises. If the bears are right then US long yields will jump once the market 
realizes that it has underestimated the scale of Fed tightening; this will deliver a shock 
to emerging market bonds which will see a sharp rise in their spread over treasuries. In 
contrast, bulls see the downward trend in long yields continuing, the result of financial 
globalization and, perhaps, a reduction in the ‘home bias’ of investors over the last 5 
years (see my earlier discussion). US yields, while low, are still higher than those in 
Europe and Japan, and hence attractive to international investors. As US yields fall, the 
level of demand for emerging market debt will rise further. This would then provide an 
excellent environment for increasing investor interest in the sovereign bonds of less 
well-known countries, especially the smaller countries of sub-Saharan Africa. How the 
bear-bull debate resolves itself will be critical to the fortunes of existing and newer 
borrowers in emerging market bonds over the next 5 or so years. 
 
Given the very good run of emerging market debt, bears have looked for signs of 
trouble among the major borrowers. Brazil and Mexico loom large in investors’ minds 
since they account for the largest weightings in EMBI+ (22.9 per cent and 19.6 per cent, 
respectively). Some believe that President da Silva, whose ruling party is now 
embroiled in a corruption scandal, will turn fiscally reckless in the run up to the 2006 
elections, but this has yet to affect the Brazilian debt market. Likewise, both Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s have upgraded Mexico’s sovereign debt rating. In 2005, 
Turkey’s debt was expected to sell-off upon a ‘no’ vote in the French and Dutch 
referendums on the EU constitution—an outcome that is believed by many to reduce 
Turkey’s chances of accession (thereby damaging the convergence of its interest rates 
with those of the EU). But the market rallied instead. Indeed, emerging market bonds 
                                                 
8 Quoted in ‘Splish Splash’, Wall Street Journal, 7 June 2005.   10
may have stronger fundamentals than the high-yield corporate bonds of OECD 
countries. Mexico is the biggest BBB-rated credit in Lehman’s investment-grade bond 
indices following the downgrade of General Motors and Ford to junk status in May 
2005.9 But it may simply be the case that country policies are less important as a market 
driver than global capital supply for, as Manuel Agosin (2005: 4) notes, countries with a 
very wide range of policy stances typically experience substantial capital inflows during 
periods of global capital surge. 
5  Globalization in goods markets and capital flows 
Despite some problems among the smaller borrowers (notably Bolivia in 2005) the 
emerging bond market class as whole looks robust in the near term. Nevertheless we 
can still find some grey clouds going forward if we look hard enough. A potentially 
serious threat for the whole asset class is what happens next in China. The ‘China 
factor’ is an important reason why the market for emerging market debt differs from 
that of ten years ago (and a factor that would have been inconceivable 20 years ago). 
And it has several interesting and inter-linked dimensions.  
 
First, China’s high growth has raised world commodity prices and therefore GDP 
growth in commodity-producers, with the resulting buoyancy in tax revenues improving 
fiscal balances and sovereign credit ratings. This makes bond ratings vulnerable to any 
commodity-price shock resulting from slower Chinese growth. Any slackening of 
Chinese demand could be offset by rising demand from continental Europe and Japan, 
both of which are showing signs of recovery, but that recovery is itself partly driven by 
their rising exports to China (especially so in the Japanese case) and both regions face a 
longer-term growth slowdown as their societies age (see our earlier discussion). US 
growth remains perilously dependent upon its over-extended consumer, who remains 
vulnerable to any rise in mortgage rates from their present low levels (itself partly a 
product of Chinese purchases of US debt which contributed to lowering long-term 
interest rates upon which most US mortgage-financing is based). It is not inconceivable 
that governments in commodity-producing countries might offset the negative fiscal 
effect of a world commodity-price fall through better tax mobilization, but progress in 
this area has been generally slow (Brazil and Mexico) or entirely absent (Venezuela). 
Better domestic revenue mobilization remains one of their most urgent challenges, not 
least to dampen the scale of their adjustment to any future China shock. 
 
Second, China is central to the story of low global inflation underpinning low interest 
rates. Many in the financial markets believe that China’s low-cost manufacturing caps 
                                                 
9 Recent progress under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in relieving a portion of 
the debts owed to official creditors is also important to changing international investor perceptions and 
increasing the possibilities for these countries to fund their development expenditures via the sale of 
sovereign debt in international markets (Addison et al. 2004).   11
inflation in goods markets (while India’s role in outsourcing contains service-sector 
inflation). This belief, which is not without foundation, has reduced inflation 
expectations and long bond yields. But rich countries must continue absorbing Chinese 
exports for low-inflation expectations to be maintained. Any major restraint on China’s 
ability to export will undermine the low inflation story, and will ratchet up bond yields, 
thereby slowing global growth overall—and cutting away one of the foundations of the 
present inflow of capital into emerging bond markets. And any slowdown in growth will 
have a knock-on effect on the growth of the financial services industry in developing 
countries as well. Similarly, an upward revaluation in the renminbi, which the US is 
pressing the Chinese to undertake, will increase the cost to US consumers of imported 
Chinese goods (this is one of the paradoxes of US-Chinese relations). 
 
Although China’s performance certainly looks spectacular, it is in fact yet to recover the 
share of world output that it had in the late nineteenth century, during the first wave of 
globalization; Crafts (2004) estimates that China accounted for 12.5 per cent of global 
manufacturing output in 1880, dropping to a low of 2.3 per cent in 1950, and rising back 
to 7 per cent in 2000. As China’s per capita income rises, so domestic demand growth 
will increasingly drive economic growth, but export growth will remain the main engine 
for the next decade at least. Access to an open trading system is therefore in China’s 
paramount interest, but a surge in its exports of clothing and textiles following the 
expiry of quotas with the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement at the start of 2005 stirred 
up a protectionist hornet’s nest in Brussels and Washington DC. 
 
Notwithstanding these problems, we should not make too much of present difficulties. 
First, if the US and Europe go beyond modest protection against China into something 
much more substantial then they will undermine their own interests in a multilateral 
trading system. And second, the differences between China, the US and Europe reflect 
national interests within the ambit of a global market economy, and do not arise from a 
contest between fundamentally different economic systems—as they did thirty or forty 
years ago when the Cold War was at its height. In that sense the politics of inter-state 
relations which underlies economic relations today has a less calamitous downside than 
it did for most of the years after the Second World War. 
 
Second, and perhaps a more lethal factor, China is one of Asia’s big buyers of US 
treasuries, thereby reducing yields at the long end of the US curve and making the 
whole class of emerging market debt—which trades at a spread above treasuries—more 
attractive to buyers. Any large-scale reduction in China’s purchases of treasuries would 
raise US long yields (unless offset by additional purchases by other Asian central banks) 
thereby reducing the relative attractiveness of high-yield debt in general, and emerging 
market debt in particular. A slowdown in Asia’s purchases of US treasuries, including 
those by China, is inevitable in any case as the renminbi and Asia’s other currencies 
appreciate against the dollar thereby reducing the region’s very large current account 
surpluses (and requiring a commensurate reduction in the US current account deficit   12
which is an unsustainable 6 per cent of GDP). A critical factor for the markets is 
whether this adjustment is orderly or not. If the former, then US long yields will move 
steadily upwards—which is what the Fed wants since it believes that US growth is now 
robust after the 9/11 shock and slowdown. The spreads of emerging market bonds over 
treasuries will then rise, but hopefully not too much to cause serious financing problems 
for Latin America and other borrowers. A disorderly adjustment would consist of a 
rapid sell-off in the US treasuries market (accelerated by hedge funds who would 
quickly take up short positions), a sharp jump in emerging market bond yields, and—in 
a worst case scenario—a liquidity crunch, locking up high-yield debt markets in 
particular.  
 
Since China’s own sovereign debt is attractive to investors (the ‘Virtanen’ story with 
which I began the paper), trouble in credit markets would hit China as well—perhaps 
therefore accelerating any initial slowdown in its growth. For this reason at least, China 
(and more broadly Asia) has an interest in an orderly and gradual adjustment of the 
present imbalances with the United States (IMF 2005). It is therefore highly unlikely 
that China would conduct a large and rapid sale of US treasuries, as some observers 
have speculated, and this is not a credible threat in US-China bilateral trade 
negotiations. There are, however, political ‘wild cards’ that could cause disorderly 
adjustment by pushing China into deep recession, resulting in a sell-off in emerging 
market debt. These include: the re-emergence of a strong domestic pro-democracy 
movement and a violent counter-reaction by the ruling communist party; a further 
deterioration in relations with Taiwan (with war being the worst-case scenario), and a 
deterioration in bilateral relations, both economic and political, with Japan. Since it is 
often ‘unexpected’ political events that initiate major global economic shocks, the 
tensions in the global politics of China’s rise should not be discounted in any 
assessment of future international financial risks. 
6 Conclusions 
So what do we conclude from all this? We might say that speculation about the future is 
largely pointless; all kinds of forecasts can be developed, most of which will never 
come to pass and it is often the unnoticed trends, or completely unexpected events, that 
prove to be decisive. Nevertheless, we can discern some broad contours of the future in 
present trends.  
 
The first set of these are the consequences that arise from financing the costs of ageing 
societies, notably Europe and Japan. This has powerful effects on international financial 
markets, and is one reasonably certain trend given the size of the retirement savings 
involved. But predicting which financial markets will benefit the most is much more 
difficult. The story in which ageing societies invest in the equity and bond markets of 
youthful developing countries could constitute the big picture for the next twenty years. 
As capital flows to developing countries are affected much more by risk rather than   13
return (i.e. variance as opposed to mean) there is potentially a ‘win-win’ outcome for 
both North and South where Northern investors get lower risk, and the South gets 
cheaper capital. If these capital flows are forthcoming then they will prove favourable to 
the expansion of Southern markets for sovereign debt, equities, corporate debt and, 
eventually, municipal debt and property as asset classes for Northern (and Southern) 
investors. To work, however, this scenario requires that societies with young 
populations use the capital flow effectively to achieve higher growth, with this in turn 
translating itself into higher returns for foreign investors so that more capital is 
forthcoming. Foreign investors must also be sufficiently risk-taking to allocate a large 
enough share of their portfolio to the relevant asset categories to significantly benefit 
from any superior returns. This will entail considerable institution-building and 
innovation, including better corporate governance among Southern companies (to 
protect shareholder rights), improved macroeconomic management to reduce exchange-
rate and credit risks and to cope with the real-economy effects of the capital inflow 
(thereby ensuring that it enhances rather damages economic development), and the 
increased use of derivative instruments to hedge some of the exchange-rate and political 
risk for international investors.  
 
The second trend is the rapid growth now underway in the financial services industry, 
which on some predictions will account for 10 per cent of global GDP by 2020—with 
much of the growth coming in the larger emerging economies (Goldman Sachs 2003). 
Deeper and more sophisticated domestic financial markets will draw in capital flows 
(attracting direct investment by international banks in joint ventures to provide financial 
services) as well as sending capital outwards (by offering domestic residents mutual 
funds that invest in foreign assets, in particular). This opens up new possibilities for 
connecting local demand for capital to the international capital market, including 
packaging microfinance loans into financial instruments that can then be sold to 
international investors (perhaps with some hedging of the currency risk) thereby 
enabling microfinance institutions to expand by diversifying from their present 
dependence on NGO and foundation funding. In summary, there is much potential but 
realizing these gains will not be easy. Fundamentally, the countries that most need 
external capital flow are the smaller and poorer countries but they have underdeveloped 
and illiquid capital markets and are often little known to investors who may bypass 
them in favour of the bigger, better known, and deeper financial markets of Brazil, 
China, and India. The smaller countries need more assistance to overcome information 
asymmetries and high transactions costs so that they can tap more effectively into 
international capital markets.  
 
The third of our future trends comes from the recent and rapid growth in demand for 
emerging market debt, and the resulting compression in spreads over developed-market 
debt. There is considerable uncertainty over what happens next. Is the present market-
strength the result of ample global liquidity (with real interest rates at historically very 
low levels) with the danger that as the interest rate cycle turns, and liquidity contracts,   14
emerging markets will turn down as they did in the past? Or have fundamentals in 
emerging markets improved sufficiently to attract continuing inflows even as US 
monetary policy tightens with, perhaps, the search for yield by investors from ageing 
societies putting some kind of floor under the market?  
 
The fourth contour in the next twenty years of international finance relates to one of the 
biggest questions of all: will globalization, and specifically trade liberalization, continue 
or will it slow, or even stall and reverse? This is critical since globalization in goods 
markets (a massive expansion of low-cost producers) has been central to the formation 
of low expectations for future inflation—and therefore to the story of low and declining 
bond yields, to the benefit of borrowers in developed and emerging economies alike. 
Here the story can take many different future paths, depending very much on your 
chosen scenario as to how the relationship between Europe, the USA, and Asia’s rising 
economies, especially China, will work itself out.  
 
To conclude: today we see a large volume of global savings moving through an 
increasingly integrated global capital market in search of investment opportunities, but 
finding low (and declining) returns. Asia continues to pour ever increasing amounts into 
low-yielding US treasuries, the counterpart to historically large US fiscal (and current-
account) deficits. Yet running alongside this process are appeals for more official aid 
and debt relief for poorer and smaller countries, especially in SSA, which urgently need 
more external finance to meet their development and poverty-reduction goals. Twenty 
years from now, this may be seen as one of the starkest contrasts in the present system 
of international finance.  
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